| BeHeadR |
12-17-2008 04:41 PM |
Ok - first I don't know why on earth people focus so much on the way the towers collapsed - in the big picture it is totally irrelevant and has been used as a red herring.
So let's start with some undisputed, provable facts:
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1999: British Intelligence Warns Al-Qaeda Plans to Use Aircraft, Possibly as Flying Bombs
MI6, the British intelligence agency, gives a secret report to liaison staff at the US embassy in London. The reports states that al-Qaeda has plans to use ?commercial aircraft? in ?unconventional ways,? ?possibly as flying bombs.? [Sunday Times (London), 6/9/2002]
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March 1999: Germany Provides CIA Hijacker?s Name and Telephone Number
German intelligence gives the CIA the first name of hijacker Marwan Alshehhi and his telephone number in the United Arab Emirates. The Germans learned the information from surveillance of suspected Islamic militants. They tell the CIA that Alshehhi has been in contact with suspected al-Qaeda members Mohammed Haydar Zammar and Mamoun Darkazanli. He is described as a United Arab Emirates student who has spent some time studying in Germany. [US Congress, 7/24/2003 ; Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Hamburg), 8/13/2003; New York Times, 2/24/2004] The Germans consider this information ?particularly valuable? and ask the CIA to track Alshehhi, but the CIA never responds until after the 9/11 attacks. The CIA decides at the time that this ?Marwan? is probably an associate of bin Laden but never track him down. It is not clear why the CIA fails to act, or if they learn his last name before 9/11. [New York Times, 2/24/2004] The Germans monitor other calls between Alshehhi and Zammar, but it isn?t clear if the CIA is also told of these or not.
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August 12, 2000: Italian Intelligence Wiretap of Al-Qaeda Cell Reveals Plan for Massive Aircraft-based Strike
Italian intelligence successfully wiretaps an al-Qaeda cell in Milan, Italy, starting in late 1999. [Boston Globe, 8/4/2002] In a wiretapped conversation from this day, Abdulsalam Ali Abdulrahman, a section chief in Yemen?s Political Security Organization (PSO - roughly the equivalent to the FBI in the US) traveling on a diplomatic passport (see Spring-Summer 1998), talks about a massive strike against the enemies of Islam involving aircraft and the sky. The conversation takes place in a car on the way to a terrorist summit near Bologna (see August 12, 2000 and Shortly After), and the person Abdulrahman talks to is Mahmoud Es Sayed, a close associate of al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri (see Before Spring 2000). There are several significant aspects to the conversation:
Abdulrahman makes comments indicating he has foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks. He says that he is ?studying airlines,? comments, ?Our focus is only on the air,? and tells Es Sayed to remember the words ?above the head.? He also says that next time they meet he hopes to bring Es Sayed ?a window or piece of the airplane,? and that the security on Alitalia and at Rome airport is poor. The name of the operation is given as ?Jihadia,? and Abdulrahman says, ?the big blow will come from the other country: one of those blows no one can ever forget.? He adds: ?[It is] moving from south to north, from east to west: whoever created this plan is crazy, but he?s also a genius. It will leave them speechless.? He also says: ?We can fight any power using candles and airplanes: they will not be able to stop us with even their most powerful weapons. We must hit them. And keep your head up.? Remember, the danger in the airports.? If it happens the newspapers from all over the world will write about it.?
Es Sayed remarks, ?I know brothers who went to America with the trick of the wedding publications.? The phrase ?Big wedding? is sometimes used by al-Qaeda as code for a bombing or attack, including 9/11 (see November 30, 1999 and Late Summer 2001), so, taken together with Abdulrahman?s remarks, this indicates an unconventional attack in the US using aircraft;
Beginning in October 2000, FBI experts will help Italian police analyze the intercepts and warnings. Related conversations are overheard early the next year (see January 24, 2001 and February 2001). The Italians understood enough to give the US an attack warning in March 2001 (see March 2001).
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January 24, 2001: Italians Hear of Brothers Going to US for ?Very, Very Secret? Plan, Other Clues
On this day, Italian intelligence hears an interesting wiretapped conversation eerily similar to the one from August 12, 2000 (see August 12, 2000). This one occurs between al-Qaeda operatives Mahmoud Es Sayed (see Summer 2000) and Ben Soltane Adel, two members of al-Qaeda?s Milan cell. Adel asks, in reference to fake documents, ?Will these work for the brothers who are going to the United States?? Sayed responds angrily, saying: ?don?t ever say those words again, not even joking!? If it?s necessary? whatever place we may be, come up and talk in my ear, because these are very important things. You must know? that this plan is very, very secret, as if you were protecting the security of the state.? This will be only one of many clues found from the Italian wiretaps and passed on to US intelligence in March 2001 (see March 2001). However, they apparently will not be properly understood until after 9/11. Adel is later arrested and convicted of belonging to a terrorist cell, and Es Sayed will flee to Afghanistan in July 2001. [Guardian, 5/30/2002]
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June 2001: Germans Warn of Plan to Use Aircraft as Missiles on US and Israeli Symbols
German intelligence warns the CIA, Britain?s intelligence agency, and Israel?s Mossad that Middle Eastern militants are planning to hijack commercial aircraft to use as weapons to attack ?American and Israeli symbols, which stand out.? A later article quotes unnamed German intelligence sources who state the information was coming from Echelon surveillance technology, and that British intelligence had access to the same warnings. However, there were other informational sources, including specific information and hints given to, but not reported by, Western and Near Eastern news media six months before 9/11. [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt), 9/11/2001; Washington Post, 9/14/2001; Fox News, 5/17/2002]
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June 13, 2001: Egypt Warns that Bin Laden Wants to Assassinate President Bush with an Explosives-Filled Airplane
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak later claims that Egyptian intelligence discovers a ?communiqué from bin Laden saying he wanted to assassinate President Bush and other G8 heads of state during their summit in Genoa, Italy? on this day. The communiqué specifically mentions this would be done via ?an airplane stuffed with explosives.? The US and Italy are sent urgent warnings of this. [New York Times, 9/26/2001] Mubarak will claim that Egyptian intelligence officials informed American intelligence officers between March and May 2001 that an Egyptian agent had penetrated al-Qaeda. Presumably, this explains how Egypt is able to give the US these warnings. [New York Times, 6/4/2002]
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